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Abstract: Two kinds of evaluative criteria are associated with Public–Private Partnership (PPP)
infrastructure projects, i.e., private evaluative criteria and public evaluative criteria. These evaluative
criteria are inversely related, that is, the higher the public benefits; the lower the private surplus.
To balance evaluative criteria in the Two-Sided Matching (TSM) decision, this paper develops
a quantitative matching decision model to select an optimal matching scheme for PPP infrastructure
projects based on the Hesitant Fuzzy Set (HFS) under unknown evaluative criterion weights. In the
model, HFS is introduced to describe values of the evaluative criteria and multi-criterion information
is fully considered given by groups. The optimal model is built and solved by maximizing the
whole deviation of each criterion so that the evaluative criterion weights are determined objectively.
Then, the match-degree of the two sides is calculated and a multi-objective optimization model is
introduced to select an optimal matching scheme via a min-max approach. The results provide new
insights and implications of the influence on evaluative criteria in the TSM decision.
Keywords: Infrastructure projects; Public–Private Partnership; Two-Sided Matching; Hesitant
Fuzzy Set
1. Introduction
With the ever-increasing pace of urbanization in China, limited financial resources of the
government have been unable to keep up [1–4]. To relieve infrastructure funding pressure and
raise the funds rate, an increasing number of local governments in China began to encourage the
private sector to participate in public investment projects. Therefore, Public–Private Partnership (PPP)
has been explored and becomes a preferred solution for contemporary infrastructure projects in the
public sector [5,6]. To be more specific, PPP is a long-term cooperation between the public and private
sectors for joint construction of urban infrastructure projects, or offering public goods and service
based on the concession agreement [7]. In PPP infrastructure projects, the formation of partnerships is
Two-Side Matching (TSM) between the public and private sectors. “Sharing interests and responsibilities
and long-term cooperation” are the most critical principles of PPP infrastructure projects [8]. During the
construction and operation process, the cooperative partners need to share interests and responsibilities
within the public and private sectors. Thus, appropriate selection of cooperative partners in a PPP
project is the basis of the project success [6,9].
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1178; doi:10.3390/su10041178 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1178 2 of 22
However, it is often difficult or impossible to give decision-making subjects (i.e., administration
organizations) precise evaluation on matching objects where there are several possible evaluative
values [10]. Moreover, group decision making is used most in modern decision making techniques
to try to avoid mistake decision caused by cognitive bias, and thus there might exist disagreement
among the decision makers (DMs) who cannot persuade each other [11]. Taking buying an established
house as an example, suppose that four members in the family of the buyer are asked to provide the
degrees to which a house is superior to another, and the members prefer to use the values between
0 and 1 to express their preferences. One member provides 0.65, one provides 0.75, one provides
0.75, and the other one provides 0.80. To describe the original evaluative information, the obfuscation
tools, such as fuzzy set, intuitive fuzzy set, have their own limitations. As a generalized form of
fuzzy set, Hesitant Fuzzy Set (HFS) [12] whose membership degree is allowed to be several evaluative
values, provides new ideas for solving hesitation and disagreement of DMs. In the above example,
the degrees to which a house is superior to another can be represented by a Hesitant Fuzzy Element
(HFE) {0.65,0.75,0.75,0.80}. In addition, determining the evaluative criterion weights is also important
since it affects the accuracy of the matching decision significantly [10].
In order to overcome the above limitations, this paper introduces HFS into TSM and considers
multi-criterion decision of PPP infrastructure projects, in which the information of evaluative criterion
weights is completely unknown. Specifically, the objectives of this study are (1) to determine
evaluative criterion weights objectively through maximizing deviation between evaluative criteria
and constructing an optimization model; and (2) to obtain an optimal matching scheme by calculating
compatibility of the two parties via Hesitant Fuzzy Element Ordered Weighted Averaging (HFEOWA),
which is further used to construct an optimal matching model. In addition, the method proposed in
this paper can be further expanded to interval the hesitant fuzzy value.
2. Literature Review
The starting point of this paper was a literature review. A literature review was performed,
followed by PPP infrastructure projects, TSM satisfaction evaluative criteria, and selection approaches
of PPP infrastructure projects according to the current project management literature.
2.1. PPP Infrastructure Projects
PPP, as an important part of a financing pattern, has been reviewed [13] and gained increasing
attention within the academic construction literature [14]. Concerning the decision process itself,
the focus has mainly been on two aspects.
Firstly, an important topic is risk identification and its allocation between the public and private
sectors. Several empirical [15,16] and, to a lesser extent, theoretical studies [14] focus on risk
identification and allocation for the delivery of PPP infrastructure projects. Some studies have been
conducted to identify and assess the risks for procuring PPP infrastructure projects and to address
their proper allocation. For example, many specific issues on PPP infrastructure projects have been
proposed, such as the top three risk factors (i.e., government intervention, government corruption,
and poor public decision making process) [17], and the opportunities and impact of political risks
under PPP schemes [1].
The second aspect involves the pricing of governmental support interventions to guarantee
a minimum revenue in the course of the operation [18,19], and the impact of governmental capacity
regulations [20]. A minimum traffic guarantee real options model was presented and applied to
the projected 1000-mile-long BR-163 toll road that will link the Brazilian Midwest to the Amazon
River [21]. With different government support mechanisms, such as design-bid-build, design-build,
design-build-finance, and design-build-finance-operate, an option-pricing framework has been
developed that enables financial assessment of different types of road projects [18].
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2.2. TSM Satisfaction Evaluative Criteria of PPP Infrastructure Projects
The PPP is generally considered a win-win mechanism that represents a collection of resources
and efforts for both the public and private sectors [6,7,13]. TSM of PPP infrastructure projects involves
both evaluation of the enterprises to the government and the evaluation of the government to the
enterprises, which results in a long-term and stable partnership, thereby ultimately maximizing
satisfaction of both sides [22,23]. Therefore, the matching satisfaction degree of both the government
and the enterprises should be fully considered in the TSM decision process of PPP infrastructure
projects [1,24].
Selecting the private partners is a key issue for PPP infrastructure projects. Zhang [25] identified
evaluative criteria that are classified into: financial, technical, safety, health, and environmental,
and managerial for PPP projects in general [26]. Ng et al. [9] indicated that it is also useful to consider
the special evaluative criteria associated with the PPP procurement process such as separate financing,
design, construction, and operational responsibilities. Also further, four evaluative criterion categories
of the public and private sectors for PPP infrastructure projects were established by Zhang et al. [27]
by using a structured questionnaire survey, which included finance, technology, safety and health,
and environment. In general, evaluative criteria of the public and private sectors can be classified into
several categories:
• Financial strength: Many scholars have reported various kinds of financial strength for TSM of
PPP infrastructure projects, such as capital strength [22–24,28], financing capacity [17,24,28,29],
and financial guarantee [30]. This criterion is used to measure financial credibility of private
sectors to deal with capital crises [31].
• Technical ability: This criterion category is the ability to establish project parameters and in-house
expertise [32]. The private sectors have to show their technical ability including advanced
technology [23–25,29], project implementation plans [22], personnel reserve [15,23,30] and
critical equipment [15,22], to carry out all construction activities required for a specific PPP
infrastructure project.
• Management ability: One of the most critical factors for the successful completion of PPP
infrastructure projects is top management ability [28]. The private sectors have to show
their management capacity to carry out all construction activities required for a specific
PPP infrastructure project, including management formalization [1,17], project management
capacity [22], ability of communication and cooperation [23], concession duration [15,30], risk
management ability [22,29], and maintenance ability [24].
• Relevant experience: As a central part of TSM decision process of PPP infrastructure projects, relevant
experience has received increasing attention in the past two decades, just as financing experience,
constructing experience, and operating experience also influence TSM decision [28–30].
• Credit level: Credit hazards can easily lead to serious cost increases and schedule delays for PPP
infrastructure projects [1]. Thus, Credit level is crucial for TSM decision [1,17,22,28,30].
• Governmental insurance: Currently there are no special laws and regulations for PPP infrastructure
projects to define the responsibility division between participants, project assessment, contract
performance and change, and conflict-solving styles [15,17,27]. However, appropriate laws and
regulations are the foundation for the private sector to participate in PPP infrastructure projects
and the premise of TSM [7] because of a longer construction cycle and increasing risk of operating
project construction.
• Governmental guarantee: The recoverable rate of investment is key for the private sector involved
in PPP infrastructure projects, thus the public sector should offer the recoverable rate of
investment to businesses via offering a government-backed rate [6,22,28], price [17,29], purchase,
and compensation in the scope of given benefit level [1,6].
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• Governmental credibility: The private sector involved in PPP infrastructure projects must be built
on project understanding but the key information about the PPP project is disclosed by the public
sector [1,15]. Many previous cases have demonstrated that unclear project information leads to
a lack of trust in the public sector [6,27]. Moreover, the private sector is in a weak position when
playing games with the public sector; and thus, the legitimate rights and interests of the private
sector are hard to guarantee [22].
• Governmental risk-sharing: There are a series of unpredictable risks due to PPP infrastructure
projects characteristically lasting a long time, and it would expose the private sector to serious
damage if these risks occurred [1,9,33]. Therefore, risk-sharing of the government affects the
quantity and quality of the private sector involved in PPP infrastructure projects [1,5,6,24,25,29]
2.3. TSM Selection Approaches
To effectively balance the main parts of PPP infrastructure projects, researchers proposed
approaches for TSM selection from economic and non-economic perspectives [5,14,22]. Considering
the uncertainty within PPP infrastructure projects, Carbonara et al. [5] established the statistical
distributions of the random input variable and Monte Carlo simulation technique to calculate
a ‘win-win’ solution for both project promoter and the host government in the concession phase;
to allow for fair risk sharing between the two parties to satisfy both private and the government through
guaranteeing minimum interests of each party; and finally, to fairly allocate risks between parties.
To evaluate and compare different PPP alternatives, Xie and Ng [34] first imitated human reasoning
and conducted multi-objective decision making through Bayesian network techniques. Then, they
proposed a decision making approach through connecting the decision making items, evaluative
criteria, and the ultimate objectives from the government, investor, and community perspective,
respectively. A weighted score approach was used to combine the objectives of the three main
stakeholders into a single value. Wang et al. [10] first constructed a bilateral matching satisfaction
index system for the PPP project at both the government and enterprise levels, and established the
matching satisfaction judgment matrices of the two sides via intuitionistic fuzzy numbers. Then, they
used the Choquet integral to match the satisfaction evaluation vectors of the two sides, and obtained
the final matching results by constructing a multi-objective decision model. Ng et al. proposed
a simulation model to assist a public partner to identify the concession period based on the expected
investment and tariff regime. Then, they presented needs for establishing different scenarios to
represent the risks and uncertainties involved and introduced a fuzzy multi-objective decision model
to trade-off the associated three concession items.
Overall, the methods mentioned above are based on general evaluating criteria and qualitative
evaluating criteria weights which are pre-assigned in a subjective way. However, the quality of the
decision results cannot be only evaluated by the superiority of the evaluating criteria and subjective
judgment of DMs, but also by the objective judgment of evaluating criteria weights [2]. Thus, how
to develop an objective way to determine the weights associated with the evaluative criteria is no
doubt important and interesting. Meanwhile, if there are a few different values in a membership set,
traditional methods usually replace these discrete values by continuous values within an interval
which do not reflect the differences of these values properly. How to develop a proper method to
handle this issue is also challenging.
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3. TSM Decision Making Model of PPP Infrastructure Projects Based on HFS
3.1. Description and Assumption
In the past several decades, the Chinese government has initiated extensive infrastructure projects
to improve quality of life in China. Initially, these projects have been fully invested by the government.
To facilitate building more projects, the government is now inviting more and more private companies
for co-investment and building to ensure financial sustainability. For some special projects, each private
company can bid one project, due to either heavy financial commitment or limit of capability and/or
capacity. At the initial stage, the government would like to have an assessment in order to allocate
the right projects to the right enterprises (i.e., different industries) considering their background and
expertise for maximizing benefit to all the involved parties. The aim of this paper is to develop a unified
framework for PPP projects optimal matching.
During the TSM decision making process, the government and the enterprises are supposed to be
evaluated through a group of subjects. Without loss of generality, the number of the subjects in the
government is supposed to not exceed the number of the subjects in the enterprise. For each subject,
further evaluation will be through a group of criteria. The criteria used to evaluate the subjects in the
government and the subjects in the enterprise are referred to as private and public evaluative criteria,
respectively. This mutual relationship is described in Figure 1. From this figure, the evaluated subjects
in the government are A1, A2, . . . , Am and the evaluated subjects in the enterprise are B1, B2, . . . , Bn
are clear The directed dotted lines between subjects in the government and subjects in the enterprise
denote government satisfaction of subjects in the enterprise and enterprise satisfaction of subjects
in the government, respectively. Undirected solid lines denote the matches between the subjects in
the government and the subjects in the enterprise. The lines joining the subjects in the government
with the evaluative criteria denote the evaluative criteria which are considered by the subjects in the
enterprise for matching. Similarly, the lines joining the subjects in the enterprise with the evaluative
criteria denote the evaluative criteria which are considered by the subjects in the government for
matching. For each subject in the government, we assume that the evaluative criteria are assumed to
be the same as in the enterprise. The same case is assumed for each subject in the enterprise subject.
However, the evaluative criteria considered for the subjects in the government might be different from
that considered for the subjects in the enterprise. Under this framework, the subjects in the government
will measure enterprise satisfaction through the left evaluative criteria c1, c2, . . . , cg and the subjects in
the enterprise will measure government satisfaction through the right evaluative criteria d1, d2, . . . , dl.
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3.2. TSM Decision Making Model Development
The research framework shown in Figure 2 presents processes and associated techniques
used in this study. Major steps include: (a) structuring an evaluative criterion system of
PPP infrastructure projects, (b) determining the evaluative criterion weights, (c) calculating the
compatibility of both sides (i.e., the subjects in government and the subjects in the enterprise),
(d) establishing the matching decision making model, (e) solving the matching decision making
model, and (f) comprehensive evaluation.Sustainability 2018, 10, 1178 6 of 22 
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Figure 2. Research framework of TSM based on Hesitant Fuzzy Element (HFE).
Structuring an evaluative criterion system. Through interview and literature review, 29 evaluative
criteria are classified into nine categories, including financial strength, technical ability, management
ability, relevant experience, credit level, governmental insurance, governmental guarantee,
governmental credibility, and governmental risk-sharing for PPP infrastructure projects. Evaluative
criteria of matching on both the public and private sectors under the PPP model are shown in
Table 1. The private evaluative criteri and the public evaluation criteria are shown in T bl s 2 and 3,
respectively. All the sub-criterion will be used for the following matching decision.
Determining the evaluative criterion weights. Using subjective and objective criteria in the weight
assignment method is essential for coordination and compromise of different evaluative criterion
weights because the evaluative criterion weights often are completely unknown [35]. The lower
difference between evaluative criterion weights means a closer preference difference between the
objects and matching objects, wh ch is not conducive to optimal atching. Moreover, determining
evaluative criterion weights effectively needs to take into account distribution characters of the
evaluative values. If there is no difference in values of a certain evaluative criterion for matching
objects, then the evaluative criterion has little effect on decision ranking, and thus, its weight should
be given a smaller value accordingly. Otherwise, the evaluative criterion has a significant effect on
decision ranking. Consequently, its weight should be given a bigger evaluative value accordingly.
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Table 1. Evaluative criteria of matching on both the public and private sectors under Public–Private Partnership (PPP) model.
Criteria Sub-Criteria
Belassi
and Tukel
[28]
Zhang
[25]
Wang
et al.
[29]
Aziz
[30]
Kwak
et al.
[24]
Chan
et al.
[15]
Chan
et al.
[17]
Chou
et al.
[22]
Ismail
[23]
Zhang
et al.
[27]
Wibowo
and Alfen
[6]
Liu
et al.
[1]
Total Number of
Hits of a Certain
Criterion
Financial strength
Capital strength
√ √ √ √ √
5
Financing capacity
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
Financial guarantee
√
1
Technical ability
Advanced technology
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
Project implementation plans
√ √ √ √ √
5
Personnel reserve
√ √ √
3
Critical equipment
√ √
2
Management ability
Management formalization
√ √ √ √
4
Project management capacity
√ √ √ √ √ √
6
Ability of communication and
cooperation
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
Concession duration
√ √ √ √
4
Risk management ability
√ √ √ √
4
Maintenance ability
√ √ √
3
Relevant experience
Financing experience
√ √
2
Constructing experience
√ √ √
3
Operating experience
√ √
2
Credit level
Enterprise qualification
√
1
Honor on projects
√
2
Social reputation
√ √ √ √
4
Government guarantee Legal guarantee
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
11
Approval guarantee
√ √ √ √ √
5
Government support
Political support
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
9
Interest rate guarantee
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
8
Price guarantee
√ √ √ √ √
5
Government credibility ———-
√ √ √
3
Government risk-sharing
Restriction of competition
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
Information transparency
√ √ √ √
4
Contract spirits
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
Risk-taking
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
11 13 18 12 11 13 10 14 8 2 10 14 –
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Table 2. Basic decomposition of evaluative criteria on the subjects in the enterprise by the subjects in
the government.
Sub-Criterion Description
1. Capital strength Total funds, quantity and scale invested for completed construction projects
2. Financing capacity The scale of financing possible
3. Financial guarantee ability Ability of obtaining financing guarantee from financial institutions for theconstruction project
4. Advanced technology The leading technology in the world
5. Project implementation plans Plan formulation of activities or process of hard work from start to finish
6. Personnel reserve Human resources to meet the demand of long-term development goal forthe enterprise
7. Critical equipment Key equipment to ensure continuous, stable, efficient and economic operation of theentire machinery
8. Management formalization
Degree of standardization on enterprise strategic management, marketing
management, human resource management, financial and tax management, material
management, etc.
9. Project management capacity Ability of plan, organization, coordination, implementation and control ofproject managers
10. Ability of communication
and cooperation Skills of coordination and communication with the government
11. Concession duration Specified period of recycling project costs on investment, operation and maintenance,and obtaining a reasonable return
12. Risk management ability Ability of minimizing the risk in a certain risky environment
13. Maintenance Ability Ability of operation and maintenance for infrastructure projects
14. Financing experience Experiences of financing the similar infrastructure projects
15. Constructing experience Experiences of constructing the similar infrastructure projects
16. Operating experience Experiences of operating the similar infrastructure projects
17. Enterprise qualifications The qualification and level of quality standard adapted to the qualification
18. Honor on projects National or provincial honor gained by the enterprises for their completed projects
19. Social reputation Credit evaluation given by partners cooperating in the enterprise
Table 3. Basic decomposition of evaluative criteria on the subjects in the government by the subjects in
the enterprise.
Sub-Criterion Description
1. Legal guarantee Laws define the responsibility division between the parties, project assessment, contractperformance and change, and the way conflicts, etc.
2. Approval guarantee The government need to provide the provision of legal guarantee to businesses involved ininfrastructure projects
3. Police guarantee The government needs to set up corresponding approval for security and incentives toencourage more businesses to participate in PPP infrastructure projects
4. Interest rate guarantee The government should offer the recoverable rate of investment to businesses via offeringgovernment-backed rate in the scope of given benefit level
5. Price guarantee The government should offer the recoverable rate of investment to businesses via offeringgovernment-backed price in the scope of given benefit level
6. Purchase guarantee The government should offer the recoverable rate of investment to businesses via offeringgovernment-backed purchase in the scope of given benefit level
7. Restriction of competition Similar projects will not build at any given time
8. Information transparency Key information about the PPP Project disclosed by the government
9. Contract spirits The government’s contract spirits to guarantee the legitimate rights and interestsof businesses
10. Contract spirits The government ought to initially bear the risks of land policy changes, legal policychanges and exchange rate changes
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Based on the above analysis, a nonlinear optimization model is established to determine evaluative
criterion weights through maximizing deviation between the values of the evaluative criteria for all
matching objects as below:
max{d(B)} =max
n
∑
q=1
d
(
Bq
)
=
n
∑
q=1
t
∑
j=1
t
∑
k 6=j
√
1
l
l
∑
λ=1
(
ωjh
σ(λ)
qj −ωkhσ(λ)qk
)2
s.t.
n
∑
j=1
ωj = 1, 0 ≤ ωj ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , t
(1)
where ωj,ωk (j, k = 1, 2, · · · , t) denote evaluative criterion weights of the enterprise Bq(q = 1, 2, · · · , n)
by the government Ap(p = 1, 2, · · · , m). Here, d(B) denotes the sum of the deviation on HFE
evaluative values of all the subjects in the enterprise by the government Ap(p = 1, 2, · · · , m).
hσ(λ)qj and h
σ(λ)
qk are the λth elements in hqj and hqk with an ascending sort order, respectively.
Calculating the compatibility on both sides. In the TSM decision making process, the government
and enterprise satisfaction (i.e., compatibility) should be taken into full account and calculated to
obtain an optimal matching scheme. In classic multi-attribute decision making theory, evaluative
values and evaluative criterion weights of schemes are weighted and summed to gain utility values
and the schemes are ranked based on the utility values. Similarly, through weighted aggregating the
evaluative value and the evaluative criterion weight of one subject in the enterprise, the utility value
of the subject in the enterprise is gained. In general, the utility values and the compatibility of all the
subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise have the same monotonicity. Based on
the above analysis, the utility values and the compatibility of all the subjects in the government and
the subjects in the enterprise can be calculated [12,36]. Consequently, the compatibility matrix of all
the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise are obtained.
Establishing the matching decision making model. After obtaining the compatibility matrices for
all the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise, 0–1 decision making variables
xij(i = 1, 2, · · · , m; j = 1, 2, · · · , n) are introduced to establish the matching decision model. If the
value of the 0–1 decision variable is equal to 1, it denotes a matching between the subjects in the
government and the subjects in the enterprise; while if the value is equal to 0, it denotes non-matching
between the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise. During the TSM decision
process, both the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise are supposed to hope
to have greater satisfaction. Then, a TSM decision model is established with the goal of maximizing
the sum of compatibility for all the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise as
following:
max Z1 =
m
∑
p=1
n
∑
q=1
µAp ,Bq xpq (2)
max Z2 =
m
∑
p=1
n
∑
q=1
µ
′
Bq ,Ap xpq (3)
s.t.
n
∑
q=1
xpq = 1, xpq ∈ {0, 1}, p = 1, 2, · · · , m (4)
m
∑
p=1
xpq ≤ 1, xpq ∈ {0, 1}, q = 1, 2, · · · , n (5)
In the model above, the compatibility matrix of all the subjects in the government given by
subjects in the enterprise and the compatibility matrix of all the subjects in the enterprise given by
subjects in the government are UA,B
(
µAp ,Bq
)
m×n
and U′B,A
(
µ
′
Bq ,Ap
)
m×n
, respectively. Formulas (2)–(3)
are the objective functions of the model to maximize the compatibility on each pair between the
subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise. Formula (4) is the constraint of the model.
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Since the number of the subjects in the government does not exceed the number of the subjects in the
enterprise, Formula (4) is an equality constraint, which implicates that one government subject only
matches one potential subject in the government and the subjects in the enterprise; while Formula (5)
is an inequality constraint, which implicates that one subject in the enterprise matches a potential
subject in the government at most.
Solving the matching decision model. The matching decision model (2)–(5) is a multi-objective
optimization problem which can be solved by many different algorithms, such as the firefly
algorithms [37,38]. This study used the method in Li and Wan [39] to solve this problem. Let the
maximum values of the above model Zmaxk (k = 1, 2) be the objective function for considering a single
objective function separately. Then, the corresponding optimal solutions can be denoted as:
Zmaxk = max
(
1
2
(
min{βk(x)|k = 1, 2}+ 12
2
∑
k=1
βk(x)
))
s.t.
n
∑
q=1
xpq = 1,
m
∑
p=1
xpq ≤ 1, xpq ∈ {0, 1}, p = 1, 2, · · · , m; q = 1, 2, · · · , n
(6)
The Model (6) is equivalent to a single-objective optimization as below:
max
(
1
2
(
min{βk(x)|k = 1, 2}+ 12
2
∑
k=1
βk(x)
))
s.t. 2βk +
2
∑
k=1
βk = 4β, xpq ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, 2; p = 1, 2, · · · , m; q = 1, 2, · · · , n
(7)
where βk is the membership of the objective function Zk(k = 1, 2) [39]. Finally, using the linear
weighted method [40] to calculate Model (7), the optimal solutions of the matching optimization model
(2)–(5) are obtained.
4. Application of Proposed Model: Calculation Example
4.1. Data Sources
This selection supposes that there are three government PPP projects (A1(3), A2(4), A3(3)), and six
filtered bidding subjects in the enterprise (B1(3), B2(4), B3(3), B4(3), B5(4), B6(2)). To improve the
matching efficiency and success rate of the subjects in the government and the subjects in the
enterprise in PPP projects and to maximize the benefits from cooperation and reduce the risk of
cooperation, the subjects in the government and the subjects in the enterprise are used to evaluate
each other on the basis of five evaluative criteria (i.e., c1: financial strength, c2: technical ability,
c3: management ability, c4: relevant experience and c5: credit level) of the private sectors, and four evaluative
criteria (i.e., d1: governmental insurance, d2: governmental guarantee, d3: governmental credibility, and d4:
governmental risk-sharing) of the public sectors developed in the Section Structuring an evaluative criterion
system. In addition, due to heterogeneity on the preference of the chief executives, HFS is applied to
describe evaluative values given by various DMs to maximize the limit retaining the initial evaluative
information. The decision making level of each subject in the government and each subject in the
enterprise is composed of several senior executives in the same position, i.e., DMs, who are the experts
in the field with at least 30 years of working experience in infrastructure projects. Numbers in the
brackets are the numbers of the members. Various DMs give their evaluative values on the basis of the
evaluative criterion system as shown in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 4. Initial evaluative values of each subject in the enterprise given by the subjects in the government.
Subjects in the
Government
Criteria
Initial Evaluative Values
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
A1
c1 (0.78,0.75,0.83) (0.91,0.87,0.90) (0.55,0.64,0.56) (0.65,0.72,0.50) (0.48,0.55,0.65) (0.47,0.57,0.49)
c2 (0.75,0.87,0.67) (0.85,0.73,0.83) (0.53,0.49,0.41) (0.86,0.83,0.78) (0.68,0.72,0.56) (0.39,0.47,0.56)
c3 (0.85,0.70,0.69) (0.67,0.53,0.49) (0.85,0.63,0.71) (0.48,0.53,0.62) (0.74,0.55,0.60) (0.74,0.79,0.83)
c4 (0.53,0.49,0.41) (0.68,0.70,0.83) (0.57,0.47,0.49) (0.89,0.92,0.80) (0.72,0.68,0.48) (0.55,0.56,0.64)
c5 (0.58,0.40,0.59) (0.63,0.56,0.58) (0.71,0.47,0.63) (0.73,0.82,0.69) (0.78,0.84,0.80) (0.56,0.58,0.63)
A2
c1 (0.69,0.71,0.82,0.75) (0.83,0.80,0.86,0.71) (0.47,0.82,0.63,0.55) (0.63,0.72,0.48,0.52) (0.58,0.68,0.55,0.62) (0.53,0.49,0.50,0.49)
c2 (0.92,0.71,0.68,0.73) (0.79,0.87,0.63,0.85) (0.51,0.81,0.38,0.71) (0.78,0.84,0.80,0.91) (0.42,0.38,0.60,0.48) (0.55,0.72,0.65,0.61)
c3 (0.74,0.65,0.72,0.80) (0.66,0.72,0.83,0.76) (0.74,0.79,0.68,0.83) (0.48,0.38,0.50,0.62) (0.66,0.58,0.42,0.55) (0.77,0.69,0.82,0.86)
c4 (0.65,0.42,0.56,0.50) (0.84,0.86,0.91,0.85) (0.65,0.56,0.58,0.49) (0.84,0.86,0.91,0.89) (0.72,0.68,0.58,0.72) (0.52,0.63,0.47,0.55)
c5 (0.55,0.48,0.35,0.42) (0.72,0.56,0.64,0.72) (0.55,0.48,0.63,0.38) (0.78,0.60,0.58,0.74) (0.78,0.69,0.78,0.84) (0.35,0.55,0.48,0.65)
A3
c1 (0.49,0.52,0.64) (0.74,0.83,0.79) (0.47,0.49,0.56) (0.62,0.58,0.72) (0.42,0.63,0.58) (0.56,0.75,0.55)
c2 (0.55,0.40,0.39) (0.82,0.79,0.85) (0.55,0.71,0.60) (0.84,0.79,0.87) (0.59,0.72,0.55) (0.60,0.48,0.49)
c3 (0.65,0.73,0.92) (0.74,0.48,0.79) (0.83,0.91,0.79) (0.48,0.32,0.48) (0.64,0.56,0.55) (0.79,0.87,0.85)
c4 (0.39,0.40,0.41) (0.68,0.84,0.79) (0.62,0.71,0.59) (0.76,0.84,0.80) (0.63,0.58,0.56) (0.56,0.65,0.41)
c5 (0.50,0.48,0.72) (0.56,0.55,0.75) (0.72,0.58,0.63) (0.56,0.48,0.60) (0.86,0.83,0.80) (0.49,0.62,0.47)
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Table 5. Initial evaluative values of each subject in the government given by the subjects in the enterprise.
Subjects in the
Enterprise Criteria
Initial Evaluative Values
A1 A2 A3
B1
d1 (0.58,0.55,0.36) (0.68,0.72,0.73) (0.63,0.58,0.60)
d2 (0.59,0.40,0.60) (0.71,0.78,0.82) (0.74,0.68,0.50)
d3 (0.50,0.58,0.38) (0.65,0.79,0.68) (0.54,0.60,0.46)
d4 (0.92,0.90,0.82) (0.64,0.49,0.53) (0.69,0.58,0.38)
B2
d1 (0.50,0.69,0.63,0.48) (0.79,0.81,0.83,0.69) (0.59,0.60,0.58,0.40)
d2 (0.52,0.40,0.49,0.60) (0.71,0.86,0.75,0.63) (0.49,0.60,0.38,0.55)
d3 (0.56,0.48,0.65,0.71) (0.63,0.74,0.87,0.72) (0.53,0.62,0.48,0.39)
d4 (0.89,0.84,0.78,0.80) (0.54,0.63,0.48,0.67) (0.54,0.57,0.48,0.62)
B3
d1 (0.49,0.63,0.58) (0.68,0.46,0.71) (0.57,0.85,0.77)
d2 (0.62,0.38,0.58) (0.56,0.67,0.87) (0.64,0.50,0.55)
d3 (0.39,0.42,0.62) (0.68,0.73,0.86) (0.63,0.46,0.50)
d4 (0.78,0.86,0.82) (0.57,0.69,0.48) (0.63,0.58,0.58)
B4
d1 (0.55,0.72,0.62) (0.72,0.68,0.63) (0.79,0.81,0.63)
d2 (0.42,0.58,0.62) (0.86,0.87,0.65) (0.55,0.36,0.63)
d3 (0.55,0.48,0.71) (0.86,0.78,0.78) (0.55,0.66,0.50)
d4 (0.79,0.86,0.78) (0.64,0.49,0.56) (0.64,0.44,0.56)
B5
d1 (0.62,0.73,0.58,0.60) (0.72,0.46,0.68,0.75) (0.69,0.58,0.59,0.68)
d2 (0.51,0.63,0.60,0.42) (0.92,0.73,0.82,0.80) (0.56,0.65,0.48,0.53)
d3 (0.36,0.42,0.48,0.56) (0.86,0.73,0.77,0.75) (0.58,0.49,0.50,0.62)
d4 (0.89,0.80,0.79,0.88) (0.57,0.63,0.46,0.39) (0.63,0.57,0.48,0.39)
B6
d1 (0.34,0.55) (0.81,0.78) (0.59,0.58)
d2 (0.58,0.55) (0.82,0.86) (0.50,0.68)
d3 (0.43,0.69) (0.68,0.73) (0.59,0.63)
d4 (0.89,0.76) (0.63,0.49) (0.78,0.57)
4.2. Model Results
To solve the TSM problem of PPP infrastructure projects, the calculation process of the proposed
method is explained in detail in Appendix A.
According to Model (7), the results can be obtained as Zmax1 = 1.7521, Z
min
1 = 1.5589;
Zmax2 = 1.7877, Z
min
2 = 1.2945; β1 =
Z1−1.5589
1.7521−1.5589 , β2 =
Z2−1.2945
1.7877−1.2945 . Then, a single-objective linear
programming model (SLPM) for the problem is presented as:
max β
s.t. 2β1 + β1 + β2 ≥ 4β, 2β2 + β1 + β2 ≥ 4β, xpq = 0 or 1; p = 1, 2, 3; q = 1, 2, · · · , 6
It is easy to obtain the objective function values as Z1 = 1.6804, Z2 = 2.0432. An optimal solution is
X* = {(1,1),(2,2),(3,6)}. According to the gained optimal solution, the best matching scheme is {A1↔B2,
A2↔B2, A3↔B6}.
4.3. Discussion and Findings
For a more precise discussion, the following three different scenarios are considered.
Case 1: In this case, the match-degree of the subjects in the government in the three-dimensional
space. For the subject A1 in the government discussed, there are six possible matchings, i.e., A1 to B1,
B2, B3, B4, B5 and B6, respectively. After A1 matching is determined, A2 can be matched with one of the
five subjects left in the enterprise. Then A3 can be matched with one of the four left. The corresponding
results are shown in Figure 3. In this figure, different colors are used to show different matching.
For example, the blue plots represent that the subject A1 matches with the subject B1 in the enterprise;
the red plots represent that the subject A1 matches with the subject B2 in the enterprise. The X-axis is
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the sum of the sequence numbers of the subject A2 and its matched subjects in the enterprise. Taking
one of the blue plots for example, the value of X-axis is 6, which indicates that the subject B4 in the
enterprise matches with the subject A2 as 4 + 2 = 6. Similarly, the Y-axis is the sum of sequence numbers
of the subject A3 and its matched subjects in the enterprise. Again, one of the blue plots is taken as
an example. The value of Y-axis is 9, which indicates that the subject B6 in the enterprise matches
with the subject A3 as 6 + 3 = 9. The Z-axis is the match-degree of subjects in the government. There
are two different lines (i.e., blue line and red line) to present different match-degree of the subjects
in the government. The blue line and the red line are the maximum and minimum match-degree for
all the subjects in the government, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, the maximum match-degree
of the subjects in the government is 1.7344; the corresponding matching scheme is {A1↔B4, A2↔B1,
A3↔B2}. The minimum match-degree of the subjects in the government is 1.5589; the corresponding
matching scheme is {A1↔B3, A2↔B6, A3↔B1}. The results show that the change of the match-degree
of the subjects in the government is not significant as the matching scheme is changed.
Case 2: In this case, the match-degree of the subjects in the enterprise in the three-dimensional space
is discussed. For the subject A1 in the government, there are six possible matching, i.e., A1 to B1, B2, B3,
B4, B5 and B6, respectively. After A1 matching is determined, A2 can be matched with one of the five
subjects left in the enterprise. Then A3 can be matched with one of the four left. The corresponding
results are shown in Figure 4. In this figure, different colors are used to show different matchings
for A1. For example, the blue plots represent that the subject A1 matches with the subject B4 in the
enterprise; the red plots represent that the subject A1 matches with the subject B2 in the enterprise.
The X-axis is the sum of the sequence numbers of the subject A2 and its matched subjects in the
enterprise. Similarly, the Y-axis is the sum of sequence numbers of the subject A3 and its matched
subjects in the enterprise. The Z-axis is the match-degree of subjects in the enterprise. There are two
different lines (i.e., the blue line and red line) to present the different match-degrees of the subjects in
the enterprise. The blue line and the red line are the maximum and minimum match-degrees for all
the subjects in the enterprise, respectively. As shown in Figure 4, the maximum match-degree of the
subjects in the enterprise is 2.0432; the corresponding matching scheme is {A1↔B6, A2↔B3, A3↔B4}.
The minimum match-degree of the subjects in the enterprise is 1.4132; the corresponding matching
scheme is {A1↔B1, A2↔B3, A3↔B6}.
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Figure 4. atch- r f j t i t t r rise in the three-dimensional space.
Case 3: In this case, the atch-degree of the subjects in the two sides in the three-dimensional space
is discussed. For the subject 1 in the govern ent, there are six possible matchings, i.e., A1 to B1, B2,
B3, B4, B5 and B6, respectively. fter 1 atc i is eter i e , 2 ca e atched with one of the
five subjects left i t e e ter rise. e 3 ca e atc e it ne of the four left. The corresponding
results r s i igure 5. In this figure, differ nt col rs are used to show different matchings for A1.
For example, th blu plots represent that the subject A1 matches with the subject B4 in th enterprise;
the ed plo s represent that the subject A1 match s with the subject B2 in the enterprise. The X-axis is
t sum of equence numbers of the subject A2 and its matched subjects in the enterprise. Simila ly,
the Y-axis is the sum of s quence numb rs of the subject A3 and its matched subjects in the enterprise.
Th Z-axis is the match-degree of t e subjects in the two sides. There are two diff nt lines (i.e., blue
line and red line) to present the different match-d grees of t e two sides. The blue line and the red
line are the maximum and mini um match-degrees for th subjects in the two parts, r spectively.
As shown in Figure 5, the maximum match-degree of t e subj cts in the two parts is 3.7236; the
corresponding matchi scheme is {A1↔B1, A2↔B3, A3 B6}. The minimu match-degree of th
subj cts in the two sides is 3.0438; the corresponding matchi scheme is {A1↔B6, A2↔B3, A3↔B4}.
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From Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3, the best matching scheme in Case 3 is neither the best matching
scheme in Case 1, nor the best matching scheme in Case 2. Similarly, the worst matching scheme
in Case 3 is neither the worst matching scheme in Case 1, nor the worst matching scheme in Case 2.
Moreover, multiple match-degrees of the subjects in the government are close to the best match-degree
of the subjects in the government in Case 1. That is, multiple matching schemes are comparatively
better for the subjects in the government [14,41]. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) (2007) claimed that the inefficiency in governance led to the failure in the implementation
of PPP in many countries. Thus, a good subject in the government was ranked first as a necessary
factor to ensure the success of PPP projects [23]. Accordingly, the best matching schemes in Case 2 and
Case 3 fully play to their advantages, because their match-degree in Case 2 and Case 3 become more
volatile compared with the others, respectively. However, as shown in Figure 6, taking all matching
schemes for the subject A1 in the government, for instance, the average match-degree of the subjects in
the government is superior to the average match-degree of the subjects in the enterprise [15,42,43].
Figure 7 depicts criterion weights on both parties involved. Specifically, the left side displays the
values of the evaluative criterion weights for each subject in the government by the subjects in the
enterprise; and the right side displays the values of the evaluative criterion weights for each subject
in the enterprise by the subjects in the government. The results shown that the evaluative criterion
weights of the three subjects in the government are very near and lie on 0.2000; while the evaluative
criterion weights of the six subjects in the enterprise remained basically stable, despite a large increase
in the third evaluative criterion of the subject B6 in the enterprise and a large decrease in the first
evaluative criterion of the subject B2 in the enterprise. Also, the average value of evaluative criterion
weights on the right side is higher than the average value of evaluative criterion weights on the left
side. It reveals that government intervention and corruption may be the major obstacles to the success
of PPP projects in China [15].
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4.4. Practical Case
The Beijing Metro Line 4, officially opened for transportation use on September 28, 2009,
is a south–north rail line that runs through urban districts in Beijing, with an overall length of
29 km and 24 stations. With an estimated investment of 153 billion Chinese Yuan (equivalent
to 22.22 billion US dollars), this construction project B of Beijing Metro Line 4 invested 46 billion
Chinese Yuan (equivalent to 6.68 billion US dollars). Aiming to assure the successful construction
of project B, Beijing Infrastructure Investment Co., LTD (BII (3)), as a representative of the subject
in the government; Siemens Traffic Technology Group (STTG (3)), Corporation Limited (MTR (4)),
Beijing First Group Co., Ltd. (BFG (4)), China Railway Construction C rporation (CRCC (3)) and
Beijing Mass Transit Railway Operation Corporation Limited (BMTRO (3)), as representatives of the
subjects n the enterprise, expressed their willingness to cooperate. An authoritative tender agency is
respo sible for the bidding work of the project representative (i.e., BII) and the enterprises in the way
of public bidding. Through qualification examination, five filtered bidding subjects in the enterprise
(i.e., STTG, MTR, BFG, CRCC, and BMTRO) are eligible to comply with the requirements of subjects in
the government. The tender agency receives relevant information from the subject in the government
and the five subjects in the enterprise. Various DMs give their evaluative values on the basis of the
evaluative criterion system as shown in Tables 6 and 7.
The values of criterion weights on BII are calculated as, in order, 0.1926, 0.1901, 0.1986, 0.2027,
and 0.2159; Meanwhile, the values of criterion weights on STTG, MTR, BFG, CRCC, and BMTRO
are calculated as, in order, 0.1849, 0.2205, 0.2221 then 0.3725; 0.3952, 0.3111, 0.2552 then 0.3878;
0.2081, 0.3451, 0.2438 then 0.2030; 0.2344, 0.2083, 0.2730 then 0.2843; 0.3450, 0.2732, 0.2000 and 0.1823,
respectively. Then, the objective function values of BII matching STTG, MTR, BFG, CRCC and
BMTRO are obtained as 0.5046, 0.5291, 0.5548, 0.4953, and 0.5 25, respectively. Similarly, objective
function values of STTG, MTR, BFG, CRCC and BMTRO matching BII as 0.5013, 0.5933, 0.5508, 0.5565,
and 0.4920, respectively. Consequently, the two optimal enterprises are MTR and BFG, wh ch coincid s
with the actual decision. he calculation process of the proposed method is shown in the Appendix.
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Table 6. Initial evaluative values on BII given by Siemens Traffic Technology Group (STTG), Corporation
Limited (MTR), Beijing First Group Co., Ltd. (BFG), China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC),
and Beijing Mass Transit Railway Operation Corporation Limited (BMTRO).
Criteria
Initial Evaluative Values
STTG MTR BFG CRCC BMTRO
c1 (0.63,0.68,0.52) (0.83,0.75,0.58) (0.57,0.74,0.71) (0.72,0.49,0.54) (0.79,0.55,0.49)
c2 (0.72,0.55,0.48) (0.68,0.59,0.47) (0.63,0.48,0.79) (0.65,0.39,0.77) (0.92,0.68,0.78)
c3 (0.56,0.64,0.39) (0.74,0.48,0.79) (0.68,0.63,0.91) (0.49,0.58,0.87) (0.44,0.57,0.63)
c4 (0.58,0.65,0.63) (0.82,0.41,0.69) (0.55,0.63,0.75) (0.57,0.49,0.75) (0.55,0.58,0.73)
c5 (0.67,0.69,0.55) (0.49,0.38,0.54) (0.62,0.81,0.56) (0.44,0.36,0.39) (0.53,0.60,0.75)
Table 7. Initial evaluative values on STTG, MTR, BFG, CRCC, and BMTRO given by BII.
Subjects in the
Enterprise Criteria
Initial Evaluative
Values
Subjects in the
Enterprise Criteria
Initial Evaluative
Values
STTG
d1 (0.78,0.89,0.62)
CRCC
d1 (0.53,0.82,0.78)
d2 (0.69,0.64,0.61) d2 (0.80,0.72,0.91)
d3 (0.55,0.68,0.69) d3 (0.64,0.64,0.57)
d4 (0.40,0.39,0.36) d4 (0.53,0.49,0.73)
MTR
d1 (0.49,0.50,0.47,0.63)
BMTRO
d1 (0.36,0.48,0.36)
d2 (0.63,0.69,0.55,0.78) d2 (0.64,0.52,0.30)
d3 (0.77,0.80,0.85,0.83) d3 (0.76,0.69,0.63)
d4 (0.49,0.50,0.50,0.64) d4 (0.81,0.59,0.86)
BFG
d1 (0.71,0.82,0.60,0.53)
d2 (0.42,0.39,0.47,0.34)
d3 (0.58,0.63,0.54,0.55)
d4 (0.76,0.69,0.61,0.70)
5. Implications
This section discusses theoretical and practical implications from the analysis of the developed
model with the case study. The first theoretical implication is the values of private evaluative criteria
and public evaluative criteria; whose values have been hardly accurate in previous studies. To evaluate
these two kinds of evaluative criteria, this paper introduces HFS to describe the values of the evaluative
criteria, where it fully considers multi-criterion information given by group. The method reveals
a new insight into the evaluative approaches on both private and public evaluative criteria of PPP
infrastructure projects. Some characteristics of PPP infrastructure projects still need to be considered
further with the evaluative values, especially for the matching decision cases which are to satisfy the
match-degree of participants, decrease matching risks, and produce an optimal matching scheme [44].
The second insight is the selection of an optimal matching method by balancing private evaluative
criteria and public evaluative criteria. Based on the values of private evaluative criteria and public
evaluative criteria, the research uncovered the match-degree of the government and the enterprise
within different evaluative criterion weights for PPP infrastructure projects. It reduces the best
matching method by applying the min-max approach. The developed model provides a new
perspective for selecting a best matching method for PPP infrastructure projects.
The practical implication of the research is to assist DMs in selecting the most suitable matching
method dynamically and objectively. The subjects in the government can improve their sincerity
level, enthusiasm for taking large risks, and react to the dynamics of prices to dispel misgivings of the
subjects in the enterprise and to ensure success of matching. Moreover, applying the proposed model
to the example demonstrated that a best matching scheme of PPP infrastructure projects is not only
to optimize matching partly from the perspective of subjects in the government, but also to consider
matching satisfaction of the subjects in the enterprise. It helps the DMs to make the best decision.
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Therefore, this research has a strong practical value in guiding and deciding optimal matching during
the decision process.
6. Conclusions
This paper developed a quantitative matching decision model of TSM decision in PPP
infrastructure projects based on HFS by balancing the match-degree of the public and private sectors.
The major contributions of the article are summarized as follows. First, to measure the match-degree of
the two sides, this model, in which information on evaluative criterion weights is completely unknown,
utilized HFS to describe multi-criterion information given by a group. Second, the best decision method
was established by maximizing the whole deviation of each criterion to determine the evaluative
criterion weights objectively. The proposed matching decision model and its application are given by
balancing the evaluative criteria of the two parts. Third, discussion and implication reveal that risks of
land policy changes, legal policy changes, and exchange rate changes of the subjects in the government
can also affect the selection of the best matching decision method. As a result, the proposed matching
decision approach is the expansion of single value in existing TSM evaluative values, which is closer
to hesitant fuzzy and uncertain information in real matching decisions. Certain limitations need to be
further studied in future. The research still needs to be investigated and explored more extensively for
the best matching plan, especially from the perspectives of the associated relationship between the
evaluative criteria.
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Appendix. The Calculation Process of the Proposed Method
Firstly, based on the evaluative criteria of matching on both the public and private sectors shown
in Table 1, and the private evaluative criteria and the public evaluation criteria shown in Tables 2 and 3,
the HFS evaluative values shown in Tables 6 and 7 for each criterion given by two sides involved from
lowest to highest are sorted. In Model (1), d(β) denotes the sum of the deviation on HFS evaluative
values of all the subjects in the enterprise by the pth subject in the government. The below formula is
obtained as:
R =

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
(A1)
Then, the Model (1) can be solved as below:
W∗ = (ω∗1 ,ω
∗
2 , · · · ,ω∗t ) =
R−1e
eR−1e
(A2)
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According to Formula (A1), evaluative matrices of each part are obtained, followed by:
RA1 =

13.6878 −8.1966 −7.8840 −7.6008 −7.5671
−8.1966 14.0327 −7.8716 −7.8435 −7.7984
−7.8840 −7.8716 13.7473 −7.4643 −7.6869
−7.6008 −7.8435 −7.4643 12.6597 −7.5038
−7.5671 −7.7984 −7.6869 −7.5038 12.8260

RA2 =

12.8667 −10.7813 −10.5978 −10.6170 −9.2973
−10.7813 14.6496 −11.1821 −11.3702 −9.8052
−10.5978 −11.1821 14.2664 −11.1359 −9.5717
−10.6170 −11.3702 −11.1359 14.4533 −10.0331
−9.2973 −9.8052 −9.5717 −10.0331 10.4475

RA3 =

12.2705 −7.2597 −7.5208 −7.0014 −7.6351
−7.2579 16.1477 −7.7726 −7.6054 −7.2808
−7.5208 −7.7726 15.7955 −7.5559 −7.7394
−7.0014 −7.6054 −7.5559 12.6093 −7.0197
−7.6351 −7.2808 −7.7394 −7.0197 12.9015

RB1 =

4.5401 −3.6401 −3.2411 −3.5217
−3.6401 5.2173 −3.4759 −3.7921
−3.2411 −3.4759 4.1373 −3.3817
−3.5217 −3.7921 −3.3817 5.6217
RB2 =

5.0031 −4.5562 −4.8539 −4.9554
−4.5562 4.1706 −4.4266 −4.4798
−4.8539 −4.4266 4.7382 −4.8735
−4.9554 −4.4798 −4.8733 5.3452

RB3 =

5.0557 −3.4966 −3.4278 −5.4310
−3.4966 4.4623 −3.3025 −3.5684
−3.4278 −3.3025 4.4084 −3.4714
−5.4310 −3.5684 −3.4714 5.4953
RB4 =

5.6810 −3.8293 −4.0413 −3.9263
−3.8293 4.8603 −3.7851 −3.5455
−4.0413 −3.7851 5.3087 −3.7393
−3.9263 −3.5455 −3.7393 5.1363

RB5 =

4.9916 −4.9621 −4.6138 −4.8403
−4.9621 5.1325 −4.8377 −4.6985
−4.6138 −4.8377 4.4888 −4.3039
−4.8403 −4.6985 −4.3039 5.0204
RB6 =

4.7342 −2.5334 −2.3613 −2.4312
−2.5334 5.5266 −2.5455 −2.6932
−2.3613 −2.5455 4.8026 −2.5617
−2.4312 −2.6932 −2.5617 5.8800

Calculated values of evaluative criterion weights on matches by the subjects in the government
and the subjects in the enterprise are shown in Table A1 according to Formula (A2).
The utility values and the compatibility of the qth subject in the enterprise by the pth subject in
the government are [12,36]:
vAp ,Bq = 1−
t
∏
j=1
(
1−
(
hpqj
)σ(λ))ωqj
(A3)
µAp ,Bq = α
(
vAp ,Bq
)e
(A4)
where e is a natural exponent; α is a parametric parameter satisfied 0 < α < 1. The greater the value of
α, the more sensitive the government is to a higher (or lower) than expected degree of satisfaction (or
disappointment) on the matching results;
(
hpqj
)σ(λ)
is the rth element in with an ascending sort order.
In a similar way, the utility values and the compatibility of the pth subject in the government by
the qth subject in the enterprise can be calculated by the following formulas [12,36]:
v′Ap ,Bq = 1−
s
∏
i=1
(
1−
(
h
′q
pi
)σ(ψ))ωpi
(A5)
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1178 20 of 22
µ
′
Bq ,Ap = α
(
v′Hp ,Gq
)e
(A6)
where
(
h
′q
pi
)σ(ψ)
is the ψth element in h
′q
pi in ascending sort order.
Calculate compatibility matrices on both sides involved for the given α = 0.6 and Formulas
(A3)–(A6) as:
UA,B =
 0.5536 0.5763 0.5003 0.5593 0.50710.5822 0.5999 0.5727 0.5706 0.5660
0.4926 0.5752 0.5458 0.5373 0.5269

U′B,A =
 0.5327 0.5692 0.5178 0.5998 0.40010.5576 0.5842 0.5406 0.5890 0.5008
0.5989 0.4988 0.5272 0.5468 0.3936

Based on the above compatibility matrices on the two sides, an optimal matching model is
established according to Formulas (2)–(5) as following:
max{Z1} =
3
∑
p=1
6
∑
q=1
µAp ,Bq xpq
max{Z2} =
m
∑
p=1
n
∑
q=1
µ
′
Bq ,Ap xpq
s.t.
6
∑
q=1
xpq = 1,
3
∑
p=1
xpq ≤ 1, xpq ∈ {0, 1}, p = 1, 2, 3; q = 1, 2, · · · , 6
The above model can be transformed and solved by utilizing the maximize method [39].
Table A1. Evaluative criterion weights on both sides involved.
Subjects in the
Government
Criterion Weights Subjects in the
Enterprise
Criterion Weights
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 d1 d2 d3 d4
A1 0.1999 0.2009 0.1960 0.2016 0.2016 B1 0.2582 0.2523 0.2624 0.2271
A2 0.2001 0.2001 0.1990 0.2024 0.1984 B2 0.1514 0.2500 0.2528 0.2461
A3 0.2130 0.1818 0.1904 0.2060 0.2088 B3 0.2769 0.2325 0.2282 0.2641
B4 0.2150 0.2194 0.2180 0.2136
B5 0.2567 0.2532 0.2509 0.2392
B6 0.2450 0.2338 0.3025 0.2187
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